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Enduring marketing theory on the  Enduring marketing theory on the  Enduring marketing theory on the  Enduring marketing theory on the 
growth & decline of retailers growth & decline of retailers growth & decline of retailers growth & decline of retailersAims and Context Aims and Context Aims and Context Aims and Context
• Uses a case study of the US department store sector c. 1910 
1965
  ‘built in organizational rigidities, cumbersomeness, a 
slowness to act, a lack of receptivity to new ideas’ (May and 
McNair, 1977, 57)
• Employs a close reading of the key marketing, retail, economic 
and management writing of the period – see paper for more 
details
  why department stores seemingly delayed wide ranging 
suburban expansion
  why department store cost structures increased and 
operating efficiency deterioratedWe need more explanation of retail theory We need more explanation of retail theory We need more explanation of retail theory We need more explanation of retail theory
• ‘Why should reasonably skilled businessmen make decisions that 
consistently lead their firms along seemingly profitable routes to 
positions of vulnerability?
  Stanley Hollander (1960, 41)
• The theory ‘ underplays the pressures faced by executives 
during the turning or inflection points between the various 
stages .[furthermore]  there is little indication of how firms 
break through the life cycle inflection points, and whether such 
points are prolonged periods. Put differently, the retail life cycle 
does not indicate the processes by which the retailer will progress 
from one stage to another’.
  Mark Palmer (2005, 719)Plan Plan Plan Plan
1. Examines the ‘department manager plan’ – an operating 
structure designed for stand alone downtown department stores
2. Analyses how traditional department stores struggled to 
replicate the centralised efficiency of chain stores even after 
extensive M&A activity in the 1920s
3. Explores the challenges associated with post 1945 suburban 
growth and interprets traditional department store organisational 
responses
4. Concludes by discussing the implications for marketing theory, 
retail change and the avoidance of retail failurePaul Mazur (1925)  Paul Mazur (1925)  Paul Mazur (1925)  Paul Mazur (1925) – – – – department department department department- - - -manager plan manager plan manager plan manager plan
• Logical organisational structure for downtown department stores
• Each department was ‘considered as a separate speciality store 
or shop. Its accounts are kept separate; and under normal 
conditions it must stand on its own feet’ (Nystrom, 1919, 256). 
• ‘in order that our large retail stores may do their buying efficiently, 
it is necessary that continuous representation takes place’ 
(Doubman and Whitaker, 1927, 117 118) 
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to organisational structure to organisational structure to organisational structure to organisational structure
• Marshall Fields – first branches in the late 1920s
• Strawbridge and Clothier   by 1931 had two branches
• Goldblatt’s – by 1936 it had nine large outlets outside of the 
Metropolitan area
• facilitated by the emergence of neighbourhood and community 
centres   intended to supply lower order goods to growing 
populations outside of the downtown 
• But generally:
  Branch has much reduced product range
  Administered by buyers and management at downtown storeThe chain store challenge The chain store challenge The chain store challenge The chain store challenge
• ‘Chain stores have matched the mass production of the modern 
manufacturer with mass distribution’ (Filene, 1924, 7)
• ‘[Chains] are armed with most of the advantages of the large 
department store, with the ubiquity of a whole group of retailers, 
They are like department stores mobilized and out for conquest’ 
(Clapp, 1920, 56)
• An emphasis on centralised scale economies in marketing and, 
more importantly, buying (Bradshaw, 1943)
• A new focus on scientific management and consolidated control 
(Hess, 1924)
  Highly skilled buyers based in head offices analysed the 
performance of product lines, adjusting buying patterns and 
merchandise offers accordingly.The chain store challenge The chain store challenge The chain store challenge The chain store challenge
• Sears and JC Penney as an exception to traditional department 
stores. Buyers specialise in buying:
  ‘Many department store buyers confine their purchases 
largely to primary sources, well known and usually 
conveniently located, mainly because such buyers lack the 
knowledge, time, or willingness to look elsewhere, Sears’s 
buyers on the contrary, when they find primary sources 
unsatisfactory, examine secondary sources which, though 
less well known and perhaps off the beaten path, produce 
quality merchandise often available at lower prices than that 
of primary sources’ (Emmet and Jeuck, 1950, 398).Consolidation and co Consolidation and co Consolidation and co Consolidation and co- - - -operation activity:  operation activity:  operation activity:  operation activity: 
decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’?
• Edward Filene’s 1927 speech 
  departments would be highly specialised with the 
centralisation of buying supported by ‘facts and scientific 
knowledge’ (p 13) 
  allow the best buyers to serve in central offices tempered by 
‘decentralized operation and selling’ (p 12)
  purchasing from ‘approved vendors’ and, given the scale of 
orders, ‘the manufacturer of vision, therefore, should be 
anxious to become a preferred source’ (Converse et al., 
1929, 44)
• Consolidation was necessary, along with changes in 
organisational structuresConsolidation and co Consolidation and co Consolidation and co Consolidation and co- - - -operation activity:  operation activity:  operation activity:  operation activity: 
decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’?
• Some informal grouping in 1920s
• Previously independent department stores form holding companies: 
  May Department Stores (1910)
  Associated Dry Goods Corporation (1913)
  Hahn Department Store Inc (1928) 
  Federated Department Stores (1929) 
But:
  ‘ most department store groups have been financial consolidations 
primarily. Until they add to that finance, enterprise, operating skill, 
knowledge and effectiveness, you won’t begin to see the real results 
of operating efficiency’ (Mazur, 1929, 16).
  ‘changing the ownership without changing the service, merely 
results in deflecting retail net profits from private owners to co 
operative owners’ (Clark et al., 1926, 257)Consolidation and co Consolidation and co Consolidation and co Consolidation and co- - - -operation activity:  operation activity:  operation activity:  operation activity: 
decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’? decentralised ‘holding companies’?
• The organisational structure remains a key hurdle:
  ‘The main obstacle to the establishment of chains of department 
stores is the separation of the buying and selling functions. As long 
as it is considered necessary that merchandise shall be bought 
under the direction of the same person who is responsible for its 
sale, consolidated purchasing for a group of stores is impossible’ 
(HBR, 1929, 381).
• Change not necessarily to the advantage of the buyer:
  ‘I am now part and parcel of a collective group of brains and the 
results I get are not credited to my individual ability. In other words, 
the system gets the credit and I come in for a very small share of 
the praise’ (New York Times, 1920).Cost increases. Trading “up” as a defence Cost increases. Trading “up” as a defence Cost increases. Trading “up” as a defence Cost increases. Trading “up” as a defence
• Expense as a percentage of sales increasing from 29% in the mid 1920s 
to around 35% by the mid 1950s (HBS data)
• Decentralised department store holding companies are even less 
competitive: 
  ‘the total expense rates of ownership groups some 20% of sales 
higher than that of true chains’ (McNair, 1950, 136).
• Service as a differentiator?
• Downtown costs
• Suffers from ‘elephantiasis’ that saw a lack of focus on costs, an 
emphasis on driving volume and an expansion of merchandise ‘far afield 
from their original business’ (Hypps, 1937, 73) 1950s Suburbanisation  1950s Suburbanisation  1950s Suburbanisation  1950s Suburbanisation – – – –
Challenging established organisational structures Challenging established organisational structures Challenging established organisational structures Challenging established organisational structures
• Department store holding companies resist until late 1950s
• But the pull of shopping centres is strong:
  Fully being enclosed, away from the street and benefitting from a 
carefully controlled tenant mix (Palmer, 1953; Stedman, 1955)
• Initially avoided each other
• Some operators build their own centres:
  J L Hudson’s (Detroit)           Dayton’s (Minneapolis) 
  May’s (St. Louis)                   Dillard’s (Arkansas) 
  Allied Stores (New York)      R H Macy (New York)Tackling organisational change Tackling organisational change Tackling organisational change Tackling organisational change
• The traditional structure became ‘increasingly poorly suited to the 
developing multiple establishment system’ (Bucklin, 1964, 41)
• ‘Traditional department store organizational patterns as the 
framework for a large scale multiunit operation has been seriously 
questioned’ (Oaks, 1956, 255) Tackling organisational change Tackling organisational change Tackling organisational change Tackling organisational change
• At Macy’s:
  ‘  the downtown store was no longer to be thought of as the 
“mother hen with her branch store chickens”. Each store was to be 
regarded as having equal status, and no one store was in an way to 
have priority over another’ (Bingham and Yunich, 1965, 138).
• At Allied Stores:
  ‘What evolved became somewhat difficult for the buyers to accept; 
that the branch store man at the top was responsible and had as 
much authority as the other four and you, as a buyer, could not go 
into a branch store and tell them to redo things because that was no 
longer your responsibility. Your responsibility was the merchandise 
selection’ (Personal Interview).1950s Suburbanisation  1950s Suburbanisation  1950s Suburbanisation  1950s Suburbanisation – – – –
Challenging established organisational structures Challenging established organisational structures Challenging established organisational structures Challenging established organisational structures
• Merger wave
  Between 1951 and 1965, the 20 largest department store 
companies had acquired 73 companies operating 168 
establishments (Bucklin, 1972)Branch Store Sales as a Percentage of Total  Branch Store Sales as a Percentage of Total  Branch Store Sales as a Percentage of Total  Branch Store Sales as a Percentage of Total 
Department Store Sales Department Store Sales Department Store Sales Department Store Sales
Year No. of 
firms
No. of 
stores
% of branch store sales to 
total sales
1951 104 193 4
1952 107 206 6
1957 104 289 23
1958 104 316 28
1959 99 303 35
N.B. Only department stores with annual sales of $10 million or more were included
Source: Brown and May, 1961, p 2Suburbanisation Rates of the Major  Suburbanisation Rates of the Major  Suburbanisation Rates of the Major  Suburbanisation Rates of the Major 
Department Store Corporations Department Store Corporations Department Store Corporations Department Store Corporations
Corporation Date when Sales from Branches Reach 
50%
Allied 1970
Associated 1967
Macy’s 1963
Federated 1967
May’s 1962
Dayton Hudson 1969
Carter Hawley Hale 1950s
Source: adapted from Laulajainen, 1987, p 235.Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
• The traditional department store became “locked in” to a 
locational and organisational structure 
  slow to adapt strategically, geographically and 
organisationally
  ‘the inertia of management arising from long experience with 
present methods – from habit and tradition’ (HBR, 1929, 380)
• Mirrors other historical studies: 
 ‘complacent and committed to established routines, 
processes and strategies’ with management failing ‘to 
assess the potential impact of these changes and develop 
appropriate strategies’ (McGovern, 2007, 900). Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
• Marketing theory has explanatory limitations:
  management inertia AND changing environmental 
circumstances
• ‘a company can never afford to get “locked in” to some particular 
approach or philosophy’ (Davidson et al., 1976, 95)
• Need to be “tight” in terms of executing efficiency, but also “loose” 
and adaptable to new circumstances (Peters and Waterman, 
2004)
• Retail history can offer relevant insights to contemporary 
problems 
  all the more relevant amid an increasing academic focus on 
retail failure and divestiture (Burt et al., 2003; Etgar and 
Rachman Moore, 2007)